Encryption Algorithm for TCP Session Hijacking by Chen, Minghan et al.
Encryption Algorithm for TCP Session Hijacking
Minghan Chen1, Fangyan Dai1, Bingjie Yan1, Jieren Cheng* and Longjuan Wang
1Hainan University, Hainan Province 570228, China
mh.chen@hainanu.edu.cn,fangyeee@163.com,
beiyuouo@foxmail.com, cjr22@163.com*,40552382@qq.com
Abstract. Distributed network of the computer and the design defects of the
TCP protocol are given to the network attack to be multiplicative. Based on the
simple and open assumptions of the TCP protocol in academic and
collaborative communication environments, the protocol lacks secure
authentication. In this paper, by adding RSA-based cryptography technology,
RSA-based signature technology, DH key exchange algorithm, and HAMC-
SHA1 integrity verification technology to the TCP protocol, and propose a
security strategy which can effectively defend against TCP session hijacking.
Keywords: TCP protocol, session hijacking, security countermeasure, three-
time handshake
1 Introduction
The transmission of network information is inseparable from the most essential
network protocol of the computer. The problem of information transmission affects
the size of the cluster and the size of the throughput. The connection-oriented TCP
protocol (Transmission Control Protocol) is often used at the transport layer. As the
most popular protocol in the world today, the TCP protocol can establish a connection
through the three-way handshake method, provide a reliable end-to-end byte
transmission stream for network information transmission and prevent packet loss.
The purpose of the three-way handshake is to synchronize the serial numbers and
acknowledgments of both parties and exchange TCP window size information.
However, since protocols such as TCP were formed in the early 1980s, more practical
aspects of the protocol were considered during design. Therefore, the TCP protocol
data stream is transmitted in plain text, which lacks encryption and authentication of
data. There are insufficient considerations in network security, such as: unable to
provide reliable identity verification, unable to effectively prevent information
leakage, and not providing reliable complete verification of information. And the
protocol has no means to occupy and allocate resources, making the TCP protocol
fragile and limited. Attacks such as IP spoofing and TCP session hijacking using the
TCP protocol are increasing. Therefore, this article studies the problem of TCP
plaintext transmission and lack of data encryption. Using the RSA asymmetric
2encryption algorithm and DH key exchange algorithm algorithm, the existing TCP
session process adds identity verification and encryption to ensure a higher algorithm
safety. At the same time, this paper improves the single authentication of the original
server to the client to achieve double-ended authentication to confirm the authenticity
of the data source. In the third handshake process, this article chooses to use HAMC-
SHA1 with a hash operation with a key, and performs HMAC-SHA1 integrity
verification for each subsequent transmission. Compared with MD5 without a key, In
this paper, identity verification is performed while encrypting, which makes the
session process more secure and can solve the problems of an attacker disguising as
an attacker and communicating with the server.
Compared to other attacks, TCP session hijacking has many benefits, such as
sniffing passwords in IP datagrams, especially when using advanced authentication
and authentication techniques. However, since all of these advanced authentication
techniques occur at the time of the connection, they will not provide protection after
this. Therefore, an attacker can enter the system simply by hijacking a legitimate
connection. This allows an attacker to appear as a legitimate user in the operating
system security mechanism [1].
From 90 mid-year introduction of cookies since the use of cookies loopholes
session hijacking attacks has been a security problem. In the article, Vissiago [2]
describes the use of Web application design flaws ED for session management attacks
and discusses the "current prevalence" of these defects. This survey emphasizes that
cookies are vulnerable to session hijacking and are not a source of ability to maintain
web authentication. Because of this, many researchers began to study network
security protocols. Wannes Meert and some other people in 2001 publish a paper
“SessionShield:Lightweight Protection Against the Session Hijacking” [3]which
presented SessionShield - a lightweight client protection mechanisms. Prevent session
hijacking by using session identifier values not used by legitimate client
scripts.Dacosta and some other researcher [4] proposed a more robust session
authentication scheme for one-time cookies (OTC) as a solution for session hijacking.
Each user request is signed by using a session secret that is securely stored in the
browser. Each token is only allowed to be used once. One cookie can significantly
improve the security of the web application with minimal impact on performance.
However, cookies have a serious design flaw that limits their security. In
particular, cookies cannot provide session integrity for an attacker capable of hosting
content on the relevant domain. Therefore, A.Bortz [5] proposed a new concept of
related domains that are vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. They proposed a
solution to suppress attacks and lightweight expansion of cookies which are secure
against related domains and network attackers. By this way, they result in session
integrity.
The simplest and most effective defense against IP spoofing, TCP spoofing and
TCP session hijacking are those that provide Inteet access. If all of these
organizations have sufficient responsibility to prevent IP datagrams coming from
outside the network from reaching the network, the above attacks cannot be
performed. Unfortunately, many networks offer unregulated Internet access.
Therefore, other means of preventing fraud and hijacking attacks must be used. The
3easiest and most effective way for an organization is to block all IP datagrams from
the network, and a properly configured firewall can be used to enforce such policies.
Therefore，Elie [6] exploited the features of a web browser to develop a secure login
system-Session Juggler, from an untrusted terminal and provided a secure logout
mechanism. In 2012, Asif and some researchers [7] found that the efficient identity
management system OpenID is easily hijacked by the session. In order to solve the
theft of user identity information caused by session hijacking, ELie and other
researchers proposed a two-factor authentication method. It authenticates the user by
checking the credentials and PIN code stored on the ID server. Even if the session
between the user and the identity provider is hijacked by an intruder, the intruder may
not be able to access the PIN due to the two-factor authentication system. Burgers and
other researchers [8] made a new way to prevent theft of the session, via the secure
communication channel negotiation bound to the application user authentication, a
server is introduced independently of the client and server software running a reverse
proxy, the mechanism Established on the communication channel of security
negotiation. This is achieved by establishing a server-side reverse proxy. It runs
independently of the client and server software.
It is also important to assess threats. For example, an attacker is less likely to
encounter hijacking an anonymous FTP session. In this regard, Stango and other
researchers [9] used threat analysis to show how potential opponents can use system
weaknesses to achieve their goals. It identifies threats and defines risk mitigation
strategies for specific architectures,features and configurations. Desmet [10] analyzed
the threats that might be associated with using web services in web applications. In
session hijacking, the intruder mimics the identity of the victim and uses the same
resource access rights as the victim. The consequences can be catastrophic because it
can lead to the loss of critical information. Therefore, session hijacking has always
been the focus of researchers, and they have proposed strategies to prevent and
mitigate session hijacking.
2 Background and relevant work
2.1 Attack on TCP
SYN attack. A SYN attack is a denial of service attack against the three-way
handshake of the TCP protocol. In the server receives from the client SYN after a
request packet will be responded by ACK, and reserve resources for the client until
the client from listening to the ACK packet start communicating parties. If the client
sends a large number of SYN packets in a short interval, the limited resources of the
server will be exhausted, the server will not continue to work, and the network hacker
successfully implements the denial of service attack. (complementary map)
Session Hijacking. The TCP protocol stipulates that authentication between two
hosts takes place during the connection establishment phase (Handshake stage), after
which no authentication is required. The lack of security for TCP session
authentication gives network hackers a chance. After the client establishes a
4connection with the server, the attacker can send a fake RST message to the client,
causing the client to terminate the session connection with the server. At this point,
the network hacker forges the data packet to communicate with the server based on
the obtained packet identifier (the client's IP address, the client's port, the server's IP
address, the server's port, the serial number, and the acknowledgment number).
3 Defense mechanism for TCP session hijacking
3.1 Improved TCP handshake scheme
Problem solving process.
The first handshake. Client by client and server issuing common certification
authority to a third party server obtaining the digital certificate server public key S+;
client to select a large prime number P and P is a primitive root of A, and the selected
private XC(XC<P); client according DH secret key exchange algorithm and P, a
computing client public key YC; client with RSA encryption algorithm to S+ is a
secret key of large prime numbers P||A||YC|| bits Description the combined data is
encrypted ciphertext C. client will SYN set a randomly selected sequence number seq
is J, the SYN packet header splicing C sent to the Server.
Second handshake. After server receiving the data packet, the data portion client and
server mutual recognition of third party certification authority's private key S- to C for
RSA decryption algorithm, to obtain a large prime number P, the original root A and
YC ; server selected private key XS(XS<P); the DH exchange algorithm and key P, a
calculation server public key YS; the DH key exchange algorithm and YC, P calculate
the session key K; server to client, and server third-party certification authority's
private key common authentication S- as a key in accordance with RSA algorithm,
YS signing obtain S; server will SYN set to 1, the ACK is set 1, randomly selected
sequence number seq is I, the acknowledgment number ack For J, the ACK message
header is spliced as data S to send the data packet to the client.
The third handshake. After the client receives the data packet, it first checks whether
the ACK is 1, and confirms whether the ack is J. If not, it discards it. If it is, it uses S+
as the key and S is the message input. According to the RSA algorithm, it is obtained.
The server 's public key YS; client uses the YS and DH key exchange algorithm P, to
calculate the session key K; the client uses the session key K as the key, according to
the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm to generate the message hash value HAMC; client will
ACK Set to 1, ack is I, with the HAMC as the data, send the packet to the server.
After receiving the data packet, the server first checks whether the ACK is 1, and
whether ack is I. If it is not discarded, if yes, the session key K is used as the key, and
the HAMC' is calculated according to the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm. If HAMC'
=HAMC, Then the connection is successfully established. 4. In the data transmission
phase, every 100 data packet senders use the session key K as a key, and according to
the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm, calculate the HAMC; the sender splicing data packets
are sent together with the HAMC;
5After receiving the data packet, the receiver uses the session key K as the key and
calculates the HAMC' according to the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm. Only when
HAMC=HAMC', the transmission can continue.
Fig. 1. Third shake of server
4 Experiment analysis
4.1 TCP session hijacking experiment
TCP Session hijacking experiment process. The server creates a socket object,
binds the IP address and port number (192.168.0.105, 49999), and then listen on the
49999 port number. The client creates socket object, binds IP address and port
number (192.168.0.104, 59999), then send a connection request to the server
(192.168.0.105 49999). The server receives the client's connection request and creates
a thread to handle the connection verification of the client's TCP protocol. The server
and client perform a TCP protocol three-way handshake to verify identity. The
attacker use Ettercap to implement ARP attack to make the client mistakenly think it
is a gateway and send packets to the attacker. Then the attacker capture the packets
that are transferred between the server and the client, as shown in the picture below.
The attacker uses the information in the TCP packet. The required information is as
follows: using TCP protocol; Time To Live: 128; Source IP address: 192.168.0.104;
Destination IP address: 192.168.0.105; Source Port: 59999; Destination Port: 49999;
Next Sequence number: 2775375568; Acknowledgment number: 2356415172.
The attacker uses the Spoof Ip4Tcp packet option in the Netwag tool and enter the
command "sudo passwd root" that attacker wants to send to the server to generate the
Netwox command.
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The attacker uses the Netwox tool to generate and send fake TCP packets to the
server.
The server receives the data packet sent by the attacker. After verification, it is
mistaken that it is the data packet sent by the client, correctly receives the data packet.
and execute the commands. The output on the server side is as follows.
7You can see that the server received the packet forged by the attacker and thought that
the packet came from the client (192.168.0.104: 59999). Then the attacker forges the
server to send the packet containing RST command to the client to let the client go
offline. After that, the attacker gets all the permissions of the client on the server.
Encryption experiment process. Note: For the convenience of experiment, the
number of prime p used in the DH key exchange protocol used in the experiment is
small, but it can be recommended according to RPC 3626 in the actual environment
should use a larger prime number, so that the attacker can not hack the server’s or
client private’s key in the DH key exchange protocol in a limited time.
Specific experimental process. In the first handshake session, the client obtains the
server's public key S+ from the digital certificate issued by the third-party authority
authenticated by the client and the server to the server:
and selects the prime number p=97, the original root A=5, the private key XC=36 in
the DH key exchange protocol, calculate the public key YC=AXA(mod p)=50 in the
DH key exchange protocol. The information is stitched in the order of the order
negotiated with the server 'p$A$XA$', and the data is obtained by encrypting with the
RSA encryption algorithm:
At the same time, the client sets SYN to 1, randomly selects the serial number seq as
J, and packs it with other information into a TCP packet and sends it to the server.
The server receives the TCP packet sent by the client, and uses the RSA private
key corresponding to the public key when the digital certificate issued by the client
and the server co-certified by the server and the server authenticates the public key:
8Fig. 5. improved three handshakes of TCP
9Then the server decrypts the information sent by the client, and the information can
only be decrypted by the server. After that the server can obtain the prime number p,
the original root A and the client public key YC in the DH key exchange protocol.
The server selects the private key XS=58 in the DH key exchange protocol, calculates
the public key YS=AXB (mod p)=44 in the DH key exchange protocol, and then
calculates the shared key K=YCXS mod p=5058 mod 97=75 in the DH key exchange
protocol.
The server encrypts the public key YS in its own DH key exchange protocol by its
own RSA private key to obtain the data:
The server sets SYN to 1, ACK to 1, randomly selects the sequence number seq as I,
confirms the acknowledgment number as J, and packs it and other required
information into a TCP packet and sends them to the client.
After the client receives the TCP packet sent to him by the server, it first checks
that the ACK is 1, the confirmation acknowledgment number is J. Then, the data
packet is decrypted by using the RSA public key S+ on the server digital certificate as
the key, and the data the public key YS in the server DH key exchange protocol
contained in the data packet is obtained.
The client then calculates the shared key K using the DH key exchange protocol
YS and according to K=XCYS=5058 mod 97=75. The client generates a mutual
authentication message=’message’ hash value :
HAMC=ada668f4688e906e157d8613dc4408ce00de1cf0
According to the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm using the shared key K in the DH key
exchange protocol as the key.
The client sets ACK to 1 and acknowledgment number to I, which packs the
HAMC and other TCP packet headers and sends them to the server.
After receiving the data packet, the server first checks that the ACK is 1, and the
acknowledgment is I. Then, using the shared key K=75 as the secret key.
HAMC'=ada668f4688e906e157d8613dc4408ce00de1cf0
It is calculated according to the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm to verify whether
HAMC'=HAMC.
After the two parties successfully establish a connection, it is required to perform
verification once every 100 data packets. The K=75 in the DH key exchange protocol
is used as the key. According to the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm, the HAMC is
calculated, and the data to be sent is sent together with the HAMC data, and the party
that accepts the verification uses the DH key exchange protocol in its own. K=75,
calculate HAMC' for verification. Message transmission can continue if and only if
HAMC = HAMC'.
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Experimental results. After experiment, this paper used the modified encrypted
TCP protocol verification, because it is impossible to brute force all possible private
keys in the theoretical time complexity, and both parties will perform message
verification every time period, which can prevent the attacker from pairing the client.
The session hijacking of the server cannot obtain the operation permission of the
client to the server, and the injection operation of the attacker to the server is
extremely effectively avoided.
5 Discuss
5.1 Limitations
The defense mechanism based on TCP session hijacking proposed in this paper can
effectively solve the session hijacking that occurs during the TCP three-way
handshake phase. However, in the data transmission process, the HAMC-SHA1
signature and integrity verification for each data packet will spend a lot of system
resources.
5.2 Solution
In order to ensure integrity verification and reduce overhead, we currently propose a
window value of 100. When the number of packets sent by the client reaches 100, the
100th data packet is signed and the counter is cleared to 0. After receiving the data
packet with the HAMC signature, the server performs integrity verification according
to the negotiated HAMC-SHA1 algorithm and the session key K. Therefore, it is
necessary to obtain a reasonable window value through a large number of
experimental and scientific mathematical proofs, and achieve the best balance
between resource consumption and security.
5.3 Advantages
HAMC-SHA1 Algorithm. Currently used integrity algorithms are MD5, MD4,
SHA1 and others. SHA1 is one of the most widely used algorithms. HMAC is a key-
related hash operation message authentication code. The HMAC algorithm using
hashing algorithm and using a message and a key as input, generates a message digest
as output. We use the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm to use the session key as the key to
perform identity verification and complete the authentication.
Window value based integrity verification. To completely prevent the session be
hijacked, it is the most reliable method for verifying the integrity of each data packet
based on the HAMC-SHA1 and session secret key. Therefore we have proposed a
more scientific window value. When the number of transmitted packets reaches the
window value, both parties perform integrity verification and the counter is reset to 0.
It can find a relative balance between security and resource consumption.
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6 Conclusion
The design flaw of the TCP protocol is an objective cause of hacker attacks, and there
are many technologies that can protect the network from attacks at present. This paper
proposes a security mechanism based on TCP three-way handshake to defend against
a well-known attack method - TCP session hijacking. First we show how to
implement session hijacking, and then we add cryptography and authentication
techniques to the TCP protocol for session hijacking. Through the three-way
handshake phase of TCP protocol combined with cryptography to enhance identity
verification, we propose a security countermeasure for session hijacking based on
TCP protocol. This security countermeasure not only can effectively identify
malicious packets constructed by network attackers, but also protect the protocol
security. At the same time, it can also sign the authentication label of the data packet
(client IP address, client port, server IP address, server port, serial number and
confirmation number). Once these identifiers are changed, they are considered to be
fake packets constructed by the attacker. If the packets can not pass the integrity
verification on the server side, the server will discard the packets. The server only
processes the data in the packet after the integrity verification is passed, and the
integrity verification is based on the HAMC-SHA1 algorithm, where the secret key is
the session key of the first handshake and the second handshake. In this way, in the
case of relatively small resource consumption, integrity verification and
authentication are implemented, and TCP session hijacking attacks are effectively
blocked.
Future work includes a large number of cyberattack experiments and mathematical
proofs, taking reasonable window values and find a balance between security and
resource consumption. When the window value is smaller, the success rate of
successfully intercepting TCP session hijacking is higher, but the resource
consumption of the server and client will become very large; when the window value
is larger, it is possible for a network attacker to take control of the communication
details of the packet before successful hijacking until the next integrity check, and the
security is reduced. Therefore, finding a scientific and reasonable window value
through mathematical proof and a large number of experimental tests is the key to the
practical application of this strategy.
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